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Fairness in Securities Arbitration:
A Constitutional Mandate?
Sarah Rudolph Cole*
Calls for reform of the securities arbitration process are not new.
Since the Supreme Court decided Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon' and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,2 the use of
arbitration to resolve customer-broker and employment disputes within
the securities industry has expanded dramatically.3 Anyone who trades
with a brokerage or works in the securities industry has agreed, as a
condition of doing business or working, to arbitrate disputes that arise in
the course of their relationship.4 Not surprisingly, not all customers or
securities employees are enamored with the securities arbitration process.
Anti-arbitration proponents often characterize the very advantages of
arbitration-its streamlined procedures, speed and confidentiality-as
problematic. Streamlined procedures and speed may disproportionately
impact the customer or employee who had little if any bargaining power
. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey Designated Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law, The
Ohio State University. Thanks to Douglas R. Cole, Hal Arkes, Peter Shane, E. Gary
Spitko, Barbara Black, Jill Gross and the Pace Investor's Rights Project and Symposium.
Thanks also to David Shelton and Michelle Robinson for their outstanding research
assistance.
1. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
2. 500 U.S. 20(1991).
3. Daniel Q. Posin, Literature Review: An Appraisal of Securities Arbitration, 13
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 246 (2002) (Supreme Court arbitration cases "spawned
the flowering of industry-specific pre-dispute arbitration agreements [especially in the
securities field]"); Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest
Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 471, 499 (1998) ("With the inception of
mandatory securities arbitration in 1987 .... The caseload of the NASD and the other
arbitration forums increased enormously .. "). In 1986, before the McMahon decision,
only 1,587 customer-broker and employment disputes were filed with NASD. In 2004,
NASD reported the filing of 8,201 customer-broker and employment disputes. See
NASD Dispute Resolution, Dispute Resolution Statistics, http://www.nasd.com/
web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDWO11183 (last visited
Oct. 5, 2005).
4. General Accounting Office Study 2000: Securities Arbitration on Review, SEC.
ARB. COMMENTATOR, Sept. 2000, at 3 (stating that "six of the nine responding broker-
dealers now require individual investors to sign PDAAs [pre-dispute arbitration
agreements] as a condition of opening some or all types of retail cash accounts. Eight of
the nine require PDAAs for options accounts and all nine require the provision for margin
accounts.").
1
PACE LA WREVIEW
when negotiating the initial agreement. Confidentiality suggests
surreptitious and underhanded tactics swept under the rug.5 With little
empirical support, critics of the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements,
both within and outside of the securities industry, began an attack in the
mid-1990s to unseat arbitration as a popular mechanism for dispute
resolution both among employers and employees and businesses and
consumers.
The attack on arbitration in the securities industry has taken
different forms over time. First, plaintiffs asserted a type of
jurisdictional challenge, claiming that statutory claims, such as
discrimination, fell outside the scope and power of industry arbitration
agreements. 6 Repeated failure of that claim precipitated a redirection of
effort. Today, challenges to arbitration primarily focus on contractual
theories, particularly unconscionability.7 These challenges have been
relatively unsuccessful within the securities industry. Therefore, critics
of arbitration have sought other means for challenging arbitration clauses
and, as a result, began leveling constitutional attacks against arbitration
in all its forms. This article will focus specifically on securities
5. Several courts have found that a confidentiality provision in an arbitration
agreement is unconscionable because such provisions favor the repeat participant in the
arbitration process by making it difficult to determine whether the arbitrator or the
arbitration process was biased. Moreover, courts find that the lack of public disclosure of
arbitration results may favor repeat players over individuals. See Ting v. AT&T, 319
F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Plaskett v. Bechtel Int'l, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 334 (D.V.I.
2003); Acorn v. Household Int'l Corp., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1171-72 (N.D. Cal. 2002);
Luna v. Household Int'l Corp. III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
6. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (rejecting
such a claim).
7. Unconscionability is the primary means used to challenge employer or business-
drafted arbitration agreements. Courts have been fairly receptive to these challenges,
striking down arbitration agreements as unconscionable where class actions are
prohibited, where an employee must pay an arbitrator's fees or a high filing fee, or where
the arbitral process is skewed in favor of the employer or business. See, e.g., Morrison v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips,
173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
8. See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 1049 (2000);
Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REv. 81, 109 (1992);
Kenneth R. Davis, Due Process Right to Judicial Review of Arbitral Punitive Damages
Awards, 32 Am. Bus. L.J. 583 (1995); Jeffery L. Fisher, State Action and the
Enforcement of Compulsory Arbitration Agreements Against Employment Discrimination
Claims, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 289, 295-96 (2000); Jean Sternlight, Rethinking
the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh
Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TuL. L.
[Vol. 26:73
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arbitration and consider whether constitutional challenges to arbitration
in the securities industry are a viable means for obtaining needed reform
of the securities arbitration process.
A necessary prerequisite for constitutional challenges to securities
arbitration is a theory under which arbitration constitutes state action.
Constitutional prohibitions, after all, apply only to state action.9 If state
action arises when a plaintiff is required to use the securities arbitration
process, that process must satisfy the constitutional requirements of due
process and equal protection. Because a finding of state action would
have significant, and likely adverse, implications on the continued use of
arbitration as the means for resolving securities-related employment
disputes, a careful consideration of whether state action is present in
securities arbitration is necessary.
Courts have had several opportunities to address the broader
question of whether judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements rises
to the level of state action as well as the more narrow question of
whether securities arbitration involves state action. Every federal court
considering either question has concluded that there is no state action
present in either securities or contractual arbitration.' 0 Although few
REv. 1 (1997).
9. The Constitution applies to non-governmental actors in some situations. For
example, the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits all people from owning
or being slaves. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
10. Perpetual Secs., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 137-39 (2d Cir. 2002); Koveleskie
v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1999); Desiderio v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1999); Lodal v. Home Ins.
Co. of Ill., No. 95-2187, 1998 WL 393766, at *6 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table
decision); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1200-02 (9th Cir.
1998); United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Safeway, Inc., No. 98-15148, 1998
WL 904719 at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 1998) (unpublished table decision); Davis v.
Prudential Secs., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1190-92 (11 th Cir. 1995); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Air Fla. Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Elmore v. Chi. & Ill. Midland
Ry. Co., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986); Dluhos v. Strasberg, No. 00-CV-3163, 2001
WL 1720272, at *5, *11 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2001), affid in part, 321 F.3d 365 (3d Cir.
2003); Century Aluminum of W. Va., Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 82 F. Supp. 2d
580, 583 n.4 (S.D. W. Va. 2000); D'Alessio v. NYSE, 125 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Brannon v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins., Co., No. CIV A. 99-3497, 2000 WL
122241, at *5 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2000); Mooring-Brown v. Bear, Steams & Co., No. 99
Civ. 4130 JSR-HBP, 2000 WL 16935 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2000); Martens v. Smith
Barney, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 134, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); McDonough v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y of the United States, No. 98 Civ. 3921(BSJ), 1999 WL 731424, at *3
n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1999); Mantle v. Upper Deck Co., 956 F. Supp. 719, 734-35
(N.D. Tex. 1997); Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp.
1460, 1465-70 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847,
1994 WL 757709, at *10, *13 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994); Cort v. Am. Arbitration
2005]
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commentators have considered whether securities arbitration involves
state action, ll the majority of commentators considering whether state
action is present in contractual arbitration have concluded that state
action is present.1 2 While I have explored this fascinating dichotomy
elsewhere, 13 this article will focus on a narrower question-whether
securities arbitration involves state action.
Part I of this article will describe the relationship between the SEC
and the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) in order to determine
whether state action is present in securities arbitration and, if so, how the
process should be reformed to satisfy constitutional requirements. In
Part II, the article will outline the Supreme Court's state action
jurisprudence and then apply it to the case of securities arbitration,
analyzing whether the SEC's involvement in the SRO arbitration process
transforms the private SROs that directly administer the arbitration
process into state actors for purposes of arbitration. While this is a
complicated question, this section concludes that SROs are state actors
when they require employees to participate in arbitration of employment
disputes. In Part III, the article will consider whether the Equal
Protection Clause is violated when a party to a securities arbitration
strikes an arbitrator for discriminatory reasons. This section concludes
that discriminatory strikes are actionable under the equal protection
theory the Supreme Court articulated in Batson v. Kentucky14 and JE.B.
v. Alabama ex rel. TB. 15 In Part IV, the article addresses the question of
Ass'n, 795 F. Supp. 970, 973 (N.D. Ca. 1992); Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc.,
716 F. Supp. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Knepp, 229 BR. 821, 840-41 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1999) (following Eleventh Circuit law despite disagreement regarding arbitration as
state action). No state courts have found state action in contractual arbitration. See, e.g.,
Hadelman v. Deluca, 876 A.2d 1136, 1138 (Conn. 2005). Only one state court suggests
that a state action finding is possible. See Williams v. O'Connor, 310 N.W.2d 825, 826
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981). One federal district court states in dicta that it "respectfully
doubts that the rationale for the result set forth in Davis ... that an arbitration award
involves no state action is well-founded." Commonwealth Assocs. v. Letsos, 40 F. Supp.
2d 170, 177 n.37 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Davis, 59 F.3d at 1191).
11. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of
Government's Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L.
REv. 529, 559-67 (1994).
12. Brunet, supra note 8, at 109; Davis, supra note 8; Fisher, supra note 8, at 295-
96; Reuben, supra note 8, at 991; Sternlight, supra note 8, at 40. But see Sarah Rudolph
Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 BYU L. REv. 1 (2005); Stephen J. Ware,
Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government's Role in Punishment
and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 529, 559-67 (1994).
13. Cole, supra note 12.
14. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
15. 511U.S. 127 (1994).
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4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss1/4
FAIRNESS IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION
whether SROs, by requiring employees to participate in the arbitration
process, have denied them a property interest without due process. Only
where a state actor denies a person a liberty or property interest may that
person challenge the action of the state actor for failure to satisfy the
requirement of the Due Process Clause. This section concludes that the
right to have one's employment claim heard in the forum of one's
choosing is a property interest. Finally, in Part V, the article considers
how to modify the securities arbitration process to satisfy the
constitutional requirements the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates before the state may deprive an individual of his
or her property interest. Although there may be other areas for reform,
the Due Process Clause requires, at the least, a well-reasoned written
opinion that includes findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I. The SEC-SRO Relationship
In order to determine whether state action is present in securities
arbitration, one must first understand the relationship the state has with
the private entity alleged to be a state actor. Understanding the
relationship between the alleged state actor and the private parties who
claim that the state actor has deprived them of their rights is critical
because state action is more likely to be found the more intertwined or
entangled the alleged state actor is with the state. This section will show
that the SEC and the SROs are intertwined in a way that, when
considered together with the SEC's requirement that representatives (i.e.
brokers) register with SROs, renders the mandatory SRO arbitration
process state action.
In the securities industry, all employment disputes are resolved in
arbitration sponsored by a SRO 16 such as the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) or the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).17
Until 1998, SROs required arbitration for all employment disputes
between broker-dealers and registered representatives. A 1998 NASD
rule change exempted statutory discrimination claims from compulsory
16. 15 U.S.C. § 780-3(b) (1994).
17. SROs include the major national securities exchanges and the NASD. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (1994). In addition, SROs
require arbitration of customer-broker disputes if the customer demands it. NASD,
Manual of Procedural Rules § 10301 (2001); NYSE, Inc., Rules & Constitution § 600(a)
(2003). Although the SROs do not mandate arbitration, all brokerage firms require that
customers sign a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate in order to open an account with the
brokerage.
2005]
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arbitration. 18 Shortly after this rule change, the NYSE and numerous
other exchanges adopted the NASD rule.' 9 Although discrimination
claims have been exempted from arbitration, the existence of a variety of
non-discrimination employment disputes as well as the prospect that the
securities industry could reverse its decision on discrimination claims
ensures that the question of whether state action is present in securities
arbitration is still quite relevant.2 °
Although SROs are not federal agencies, they are responsible for
protecting investors from wrongful acts their members commit.21 No
statute mandated the creation of these SROs and the government does
not appoint SRO board members. In addition, government employees do
not serve on any NASD or NYSE board or committee. Nevertheless, the
SROs maintain significant government connections. For example, the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) is responsible for providing
18. NYSE, Inc., Const. art. XI, § 1 (2003) ("[a]ny controversy between parties who
are members, allied members or member organizations and any controversy between a
member, allied member or member organization and any other person arising out of the
business of such member, allied member or member organization... shall at the instance
of any such party, be submitted for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this
Constitution and such rules as the Board may from time to time adopt."); NYSE, Inc.,
Rules and Constitution § 600(a) (2003) (any customer or non-member dispute with a
member shall be arbitrated pursuant to written agreement or customer or non-member
demand); Id. § 607 (all non-members and public customers with disputes involving over
$10,000 will have claims arbitrated by three-person panel); Order Granting Approval to
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claims, Exchange Act Release No. 40,109, 67 SEC Docket 824, 1998 WL 327716 (June
22, 1998) (associated persons are no longer required to arbitrate statutory employment
discrimination claims but must still arbitrate other employment-related claims and
business-related claims involving customers or other persons).
19. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Rules and Constitution § 600(f) (June 2003) ("[a]ny
claim alleging employment discrimination, including any sexual harassment claim, in
violation of a statute shall be eligible for submission to arbitration under these Rules only
where the parties have agreed to arbitrate the claim after it has arisen.").
20. When the NASD announced the rule change, it stated that "associated persons
still will be required to arbitrate other employment-related claims .. " Order Granting
Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims, Exchange Act Release No. 40,109, 1998 WL 327716 at * 1. Non-
discrimination employment claims include, but are not limited to, the following: Family
and Medical Leave Act, ERISA, whistleblower, Employee Polygraph Protection Act,
invasion to privacy, disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information, Fair Credit
Reporting Act, defamation, wrongful termination, negligent supervision, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
21. Federal law requires the NASD to promulgate rules that balance the need to
"protect investors and the public interest [and prohibit] unfair discrimination between
customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers." 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2003).
[Vol. 26:73
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oversight of the SROs. 22 The SEC must approve each SRO's
organizational rules before the rules become effective. 23 The SEC also
reviews existing SRO rules and may approve or disapprove proposed
new rules. 24 Moreover, it can alter or abrogate existing rules25 and may
proceed against a SRO if the SRO does not enforce its own rules. The
SEC also ensures quality and competence of representatives through
registration requirements and criminal conviction reporting
requirements.
26
More importantly, the SEC has been anything but a passive
bystander regarding the implementation of SRO arbitration. In 1975,
Congress amended the Exchange Act and "drastically shifted the balance
of rulemaking power in favor of Commission oversight. 27 According to
a Senate Report, the 1975 amendments conferred upon the SEC "a much
larger role than it had in the past. . . ." over the SROs.28  The 1975
amendments, among other things, dramatically curtailed the SROs'
freedom to regulate without SEC control. 29 Following adoption of the
amendments, the SROs had to submit a proposed rule, with
accompanying supporting material, to the SEC for approval. The SEC
would then submit the rule for public comment and ultimately make a
decision whether or not to approve the rule. The SEC could approve the
proposed rule only if the rule is consistent with the requirements and
goals of the Exchange Act "to protect investors and the public interest."
30
The amendments also impacted SRO arbitration procedures. In the
late 1970s, the SEC began pushing for a systematic method for resolving
small securities claims. In response to this push, SRO representatives,
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2003).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)-(b), 78o-3(a)-(b) (2003). One commentator stated that the
SEC's ability to approve or disapprove SRO rules enables the SEC to "virtually
exercise[] plenary authority over the arbitration [p]rocedures adopted by the national
securities exchanges and securities self-regulatory associations." THOMAS H. OEHMKE, I
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 28:8 (2004).
24. § 78s(1).
25. Id.; see also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232
(1987) (stating that the SEC has plenary authority over SRO arbitration procedures and
has the power to "abrogate, add to, and delete from" SRO arbitration rules if necessary or
appropriate to enforce the Securities Act).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (1993); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b2-2 (1993).
27. See Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1129 (9th
Cir. 2003).
28. Id. at 1130.
29. Id.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2003).
2005]
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the public and the Securities Industry Association formed the Securities
Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA). SICA created a Uniform
Code of Arbitration that the SROs adopted in 1979-80.31 Although the
SROs are not obligated to follow SICA's recommendations, until very
recently, they have done so. 3 2 In addition, following adoption of the
1975 amendments, the SEC created the U-4 registration form which
includes the standard clause mandating arbitration of all disputes arising
out of a registered representative's employment.33
In 1986, the Supreme Court, in Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon,34 ruled that federal securities claims could be arbitrated. In
that case, the Court emphasized that the SEC had "expansive power to
ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures employed by the
SROs.' 35 According to the Court, the SEC's ability to change, delete or
abrogate SRO rules if it believes they are inconsistent with the objectives
of the Exchange Act gives the SEC plenary power over SRO arbitration
procedures.36
Following the McMahon decision, the SEC sent a letter to SICA
recommending substantial reforms of the existing informal arbitration
process. The SEC recommended that arbitrators should be trained in
securities and relevant state law, that a record of the proceedings be
maintained to facilitate judicial review of arbitration awards, and that the
awards themselves become somewhat more detailed.37 While the SROs
did not adopt all of the SEC's recommendations, they nevertheless
significantly reformed the arbitration process. 38 The SEC approved these
31. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law
in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 998 (2002).
32. Id.
33. Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 941, n.9 (5th
Cir. 1971).
34. 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
35. Id. at 233. The Court noted that the SEC has not always had plenary authority
regarding the rules governing the SROs. According to the Court, however, the 1975
Amendments to § 19 of the Exchange Act conferred substantial power on the SEC to
ensure the adequacy of arbitration procedures. Among other things, the Court stated,
proposed rules may not be enacted unless the SEC approves them. In addition, the SEC
may, independently, change or delete any SRO rules if it finds such action necessary to
"further the objectives of the Act." Id.
36. Id. at 233-34.
37. Letter from Richard G. Ketchum, Director of Division of Market Regulation,
SEC, to SICA Members, in MARK D. FITTERMAN, ET AL., SEC INITIATIVES FOR CHANGES
IN SRO ARBITRATION RULES 257, 279 App. A (1988).
38. Id.
[Vol. 26:73
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reforms,39 but did not abandon its previous efforts and indicated that it
would continue to push for arbitration reform particularly if arbitration
became an exclusive forum for resolution of securities disputes. 40 The
SEC has continued to monitor the use of arbitration and recommend
changes to the arbitration process throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
4 1
According to Professors Black and Gross, "the SEC and SROs have
spent considerable time and effort since McMahon to amend procedural
rules governing securities arbitrations ... 42
Moreover, in a series of recent cases, the SEC itself has emphasized
that its oversight of the SROs is "comprehensive" and that only the SEC
can decide what kinds of rules and standards are appropriate for
governance of SRO arbitration procedures.43 In Credit Suisse First
Boston Corp. v. Grunwald and Jevne v. Superior Court, both the Ninth
Circuit and the California Supreme Court concluded that the NASD
arbitration rules have the "force of federal law" and thus pre-empt
California's arbitrator ethics regulations. 4 In the Jevne case, the SEC
stated that "only the Commission can decide what disclosure and
disqualification standards are appropriate for the protection of investors
and employees in SRO arbitration .... Although both the SEC and
39. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the NYSE, NASD, and
AMEX Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses,
Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, 43 SEC Docket 1250, 1989 SEC LEXIS 843 (May
10, 1989).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Adoption of Form U-3, Now Designated Form BD, and Amendment
of Rule 15b3-1; Adoption of Form U-4 and Amendment of Rule 15b8-1, Exchange Act
Release No. 11,424, 7 SEC Docket 2 (May 16, 1975) (form U-4); Order Approving
Proposed Rule Changes by the NYSE, NASD, and AMEX Relating to the Arbitration
Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, Exchange Act Release No.
26,805, 1989 SEC LEXIS 843 at *5 (during the past two decades, "[tihe majority of the
proposals to amend the [exchange' arbitration] rules were ... in response to the...
Commission letters."); id. at *3-*5, *7, *16, *22, *31, *32, *44 n.51, *51 n.59
(describing the SEC's ongoing series of letters to SICA, that presented the SEC
recommendations regarding the exchanges' arbitration procedures, and requested that the
exchanges amend their rules to conform to the SEC's views, and resulted in a series of
proposed rule changes that were developed in response to the Commission's letters.
Approving multiple changes to arbitration procedures, including fee, discovery, and panel
selection matters, and rejecting public comments requesting, inter alia, that arbitrators be
required to state the reasons for their decisions).
42. Black & Gross, supra note 31, at 1005.
43. See Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.
2003); see also Jevne v. Superior Ct., 111 P.3d 954 (Cal. 2005).
44. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 400 F.3d at 1121; Jevne, 111 P.3d at 972.
45. Jevne, 111 P.3d at 969.
2005]
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the SROs assert that SROs are not state actors, the SEC's actions speak
considerably louder than their words.
Perhaps the most critical piece of support for a finding of state
action in securities arbitration was the SEC's decision in 1993 to
implement a requirement that all representatives register with an SRO.46
As the Ninth Circuit stated in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., the
new rule is a "government-mandated 'condition to any participation in
a. .. securities career.' ' 47  For registered representatives beginning
employment since 1993, the SEC is effectively mandating participation
in arbitration for disputes that arise during the course of employment.
While the agreement to arbitrate is contained in a private contract with an
SRO, the mandatory registration requirement, when considered together
with the lack of dispute resolution alternatives available to registered
representatives, transforms the SRO mandatory arbitration process into
state action.
Scrutinizing the relationship between the SEC and the SROs reveals
that the SEC has been actively involved in creating and amending the
SRO arbitration process. The SEC is empowered to ensure that SRO
arbitration procedures adequately protect individual's due process rights
and is consistently involved in ensuring that, in its view, these rights are
vindicated appropriately in the SRO arbitration process. Moreover, fully
aware that SROs require arbitration of employment and other types of
claims, the SEC mandated that representatives register with an SRO as a
condition of their employment. The SEC's energetic participation in the
formation and maintenance of the SRO arbitration process, together with
its registration requirement, demonstrates that the relationship between
the entities is very closely intertwined and transforms the private SRO
into a state actor when it requires that brokers participate in the
arbitration process.48
46. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (1993).
47. 144 F.3d 1182, 1201 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 941
(D.C. Cir. 1995)).
48. Professor Stephen J. Ware contended that the close relationship between SROs
and the SEC created state action when the SRO mandated arbitration because such
pervasive governmental regulation invalidates employee consent to the arbitration
process. Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 83, 138-59 (1996). Others have contended that SROs are state actors in other
contexts, such as when they conduct criminal investigations of persons who have
allegedly committed securities offenses. See William I. Friedman, The Fourteenth
Amendment's Public/Private Distinction Among Securities Regulators in the U.S.
Marketplace-Revisited, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 727 (2004); Jody Freeman,
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 579 (2000).
[Vol. 26:73
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II. State Action Doctrine
In this article, I contend that SROs are state actors when they
mandate that their employees resolve disputes using arbitration. SROs
are state actors in this context because the SEC, a government agency,
requires that brokerage employees register with an SRO as a condition of
their employment. The registration requirement, when considered with
the SRO requirement that employees arbitrate their claims, creates state
action. To understand why an SRO is a state actor in the arbitration
context, this article will examine the state action jurisprudence, both in
the Supreme Court and lower courts, to determine what case law is
relevant to evaluate the question of whether state action is present in
securities arbitration. Once the relevant principles for assessing state
action are identified, the article will apply those legal principles to the
arbitration context.
A. Theory Underlying State Action
The Supreme Court's state action doctrine explains that
constitutional protections of individual rights and liberties apply only to
the actions of governmental bodies. Unless the person or entity charged
with a constitutional violation is acting on behalf of the state, no
constitutional action against that person or entity can be maintained. The
state action doctrine is important because it assures the maintenance of
the public/private dichotomy that lies at the very heart of liberal
democratic theory.49 In order to maintain the dichotomy, the state action
doctrine dictates that courts must carefully consider the implications of
extending to non-governmental actors constitutional norms designed to
limit governmental power. Proper consideration is essential to ensure
that the boundaries between judicial and legislative authority are
maintained,50 that constitutional norms are not extended so far that they
49. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 44-73 (Thomas P. Reardon
ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1952) (1690); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw.
U. L. REV. 503, 535-36 (1985) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Rethinking]; Sheila S.
Kennedy, When is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-
Private Partnerships, II GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 203, 209 (2001); Paul Schiff
Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying
Constitutional Norms to "Private" Regulations, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1288-89
(2000); G. S. Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search
for Government Responsibility, 34 HOuS. L. REV. 333, 336 (1997).
50. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982) (court
enforcement of state action transfers authority from legislative to judicial branch
20051
11
PACE LAWREVIEW
become liberty-infringing rather than liberty-enhancing,51 and that
federal governmental authority remains properly circumscribed. 2 At the
same time, a state action doctrine is necessary so that private actors,
acting on behalf of the state, do not infringe on or violate the rights of
others.
While the theory underlying state action is well-understood,
determining whether an individual is a state actor when she allegedly
violates constitutional rights is not easily predictable. As numerous
commentators have stated, predicting when and under what
circumstances state action exists is both one of the more difficult and
important questions confronting the federal courts today.5 3 This article
will offer a basic outline of the Court's state action doctrine and then
apply it to securities arbitration.
The threshold inquiry in any case involving a private individual or
entity accused of violating the Fourteenth Amendment is whether that
private entity may be regarded as a state actor.54 While the Court views
the state action inquiry as a "fact-intensive" one, it has nevertheless
rendering regulatory framework subject to judicial modification); Costa del Moral v.
Servicios Legales de Puerto Rico, 63 F. Supp. 2d 165, 171-72 (D.P.R. 1999); Parker v.
Clarke, 905 F. Supp. 638, 641-42 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Total Television Entm't Corp. v.
Chestnut Hill Vill. Assocs., 145 F.R.D. 375, 378-79 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Smith v. Wood, 649
F. Supp. 901, 908 (E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Johnson, 460 N.Y.S.2d 932, 956-57 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983) (Niehoff, J., dissenting).
51. For example, procedural due process requirements that ensure governmental
action is neither arbitrary nor capricious would greatly disrupt the operation of a private
business or dispute resolution system. Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 49, at 535-
36 (state action doctrine protects individual liberty by creating zone of conduct that need
not comply with the Constitution).
52. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936; Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156
(1978); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974); The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883); Cmty. Med. Ctr v. Emergency Med. Servs. of Ne. Penn., 712 F.2d
878, 879 (3d Cir. 1983); Elam v. Montgomery County, 573 F. Supp. 797, 803 (S.D. Ohio
1983). Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 49, at 536 (limiting constitutional
protections to state action preserves state sovereignty by allowing state to govern private
behavior).
53. See Martin A. Schwartz & Erwin Chemerinsky, Dialogue on State Action, 16
TOURo L. REV. 775, 776 (2000); Ware, supra note 48, at 559; Reuben, supra note 8, at
990; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of
Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 304
(1995) (applying state action test is difficult); Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 49, at
503; Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action, " Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (state action is a "conceptual disaster
area."); R. George Wright, State Action and State Responsibility, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
685 (1989).
54. Krotoszynski, supra note 53, at 314.
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routinely used four tests to determine whether state action is present in a
particular case.55 First, state action exists when the government becomes
excessively entangled with private behavior and encourages or causes the
unconstitutional behavior.56 Second, state action exists when a private
entity performs what is traditionally an exclusively public function.
57
Third, state action exists when the private actor and the government have
a "symbiotic relationship. 58 Finally, the Court may consider whether
there is "pervasive entwinement" between the state and private entities.59
While these formulations provide broad guidance to courts faced with
state action questions, the range of factors that may be relevant in a
particular case makes predicting the outcome of a state action case
extremely difficult. Because securities arbitration involves a government
agency interacting with private entities, the most salient question is
whether the government's involvement in the decisions of the securities
industry members when they implement their arbitration program rises to
the level of state action. Thus, for purposes of this paper, the primary
relevant test is entanglement. 60 As a result, this article will focus on the
55. Flagg Bros., Inc., 436 U.S. at 166; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357; Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1965); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170
(1970); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999); Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967); Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 311 (4th Cir. 2001);
DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 507 (4th Cir. 1999); Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202
F.3d 821, 808 (6th Cir. 2000); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (no close
nexus between private school's personnel decisions and state even though state
extensively regulates school); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (state not
responsible for nursing home decision to transfer patients even though state extensively
regulates nursing homes).
56. See Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 52; Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (holding no close nexus
between private school's personnel decisions and state even though state extensively
regulates school); Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (holding that the state not responsible for
nursing home decision to transfer patients even though state extensively regulates nursing
homes); Flagg Bros., Inc., 436 U.S. at 166; Adickes, 398 U.S. at 170; Mulkey, 387 U.S. at
378; Irvis, 407 U.S. at 173; Anderson, 249 F.3d at 311; City of Memphis, 202 F.3d at 808;
Trani, 191 F.3d at 507.
57. Flagg Bros., Inc., 436 U.S. at 157; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353; Rendell-Baker,
457 U.S. at 842; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991).
58. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (illustrating
symbiotic relationship).
59. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
60. To establish a symbiotic relationship that turns a private entity into a state actor,
courts engage in a "highly contextual" inquiry that focuses on whether the private entity
receives state subsidies or aid. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 723; A. Michael Froomkin,
Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the
Constitution, 50 DuKE L. J. 17, 123 (2000) (citing J.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694,
698 (D. Ariz. 1993)). In Burton, the Court emphasized that the correct inquiry involved
"sifting facts and weighing circumstances" to determine if there is a symbiotic
2005]
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Court's use of the entanglement test.
1. Entanglement
To determine whether entanglement exists, a court considers
whether there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged
action that the action may be "fairly treated as that of the State itself. ' 61
Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence
of the State is not state action.62 Instead, entanglement may be found if
the challenged activity results from the State's provision of "significant
encouragement, either overt or covert.,
63
Like the state action inquiry generally, the question of whether the
nexus is sufficiently close has always been a fact-intensive one.64
Nevertheless, certain principles guide Supreme Court jurisprudence. A
review of the Supreme Court cases involving state action reveal that the
relationship. 365 U.S. at 722. The Court determined in Burton that the public funds
provided to the facility, together with state agency ownership and operation, created a
symbiotic relationship. Id. at 722-26. Burton was the high watermark for the symbiotic
relationship test. Today, the Court will find symbiotic relationships only in cases
involving direct governmental aid to the alleged state actor. See JOHN E. NOWAK, ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.4, at 528 (6th ed. 2000). In arbitration, direct government
subsidies to the alleged wrongdoer, the arbitral litigant, are nonexistent. Even when the
government pays the private third party neutral, which happens only in court-ordered
arbitration, application of the symbiotic relationship test would result in a finding that the
arbitrator is a state actor, a fact that this article concedes. Because no direct subsidy is
provided to the arbitral litigants in court-ordered or contractual arbitration, the symbiotic
relationship test is inapposite. The public function test is satisfied when a function that is
traditionally an exclusive governmental service is delegated to a private actor. Examples
of traditional public functions include running a political primary and managing a town.
See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
According to the public function doctrine, state action attaches only to those functions
that the government traditionally has performed. The Supreme Court has narrowly
defined the public function category and has held that dispute settlement is not
traditionally an exclusive state function. Flagg Bros., Inc., 436 U.S. at 161. In light of
Flagg Bros., Inc. and the fact that arbitration has long existed outside of the judicial
system, it seems very unlikely that securities arbitration would be considered a public
function. For additional discussion of this issue, see Cole, supra note 13.
61. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 289 (2001) (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419
U.S. 347, 351 (1974)); Flagg Bros., Inc., 436 U.S. at 157; see Adickes, 398 U.S. at 170.
62. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357.
63. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 (citations omitted).
64. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (state action
determination is a "necessarily fact-bound inquiry"); Burton, 365 U.S. at 726 (a state
action finding "can be determined only in the framework of the peculiar facts or
circumstances present."); Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295-96; see also Jackson, 419
U.S. at 349-50; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1965).
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Court divides state action cases into two categories: [1] cases that
involve direct or indirect racial decision-making; and [2] cases that do
not involve race-based classifications. Because the decision to send
cases to arbitration in the securities industry is made without regard to
race, 65 only the second category of cases is relevant to determining
whether state action is present in securities arbitration. For entanglement
cases that do not involve race, commentators examining the Supreme
Court cases have concluded that the Court engages in a contacts analysis
to determine whether state action is present.66 In other words, to
determine entanglement, the Court evaluates the interactions between the
state entity and the private entity alleged to have engaged in state action
to determine whether there are sufficient contacts between the two to
satisfy the state action requirement.
a. Non-Race-Based Entanglement Cases
To determine whether state action is present, courts focus on the
number and quality of contacts that exist between the government and
the private action.67 Contacts giving rise to a finding of entanglement
include significant government encouragement, funding, licensing,
and/or regulation.68 Although there is no identifiable point when the
numerosity of contacts becomes excessive entanglement, at some point
along the "nexus continuum" the courts will find that a private actor's
behavior, because of its connectedness with the state, is state action.69
65. The strongest argument for application of the more lenient race-based
entanglement test is that the SEC's encouragement of arbitration to resolve disputes in
the securities industry has a disproportionate impact on minorities. Yet, in the context of
judicial decisions to enforce private actions that disadvantage racial minorities, the Court
has repeatedly held that state action does not arise unless there is some non-neutral
involvement of the courts with the private action. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). In the securities context, the Court would
consider whether the SROs' collective decision to send all cases to arbitration is a neutral
scheme. Since there is no evidence that the SRO selectively chooses which cases to send
to arbitration, even if arbitration has a disproportionate impact on minorities (a fact
certainly not in evidence), the Court would not apply the race-based entanglement test to
evaluate whether the SRO action is state action.
66. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 60, at 519 (no formal test for amount of contacts that
rises to the level of state action); See Krotszynski, supra note 53, at 337 (meta-analysis
including number of contacts); see also Buchanan, supra note 49.
67. Buchanan, supra note 49, at 347 (court examines one or more links or contact
points); Krotszynski, supra note 53, at 314-15 (contacts analysis).
68. NOWAK, ET AL., supra note 60, § 12.3, at 519-27, and § 12.4, at 528-40.
69. Buchanan, supra note 49, at 347; Krotszynski, supra note 53 (advocating
contacts analysis).
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The Supreme Court's state action cases most analogous to the SEC-
SRO relationship are those that involve pervasive state regulation of the
private entity.7° It is rare for the Supreme Court to find entanglement in
these cases. Nevertheless, a case law examination helps to articulate the
process a court would use to evaluate whether state action is present in a
particular case. The factual scenarios most similar to the SEC-SRO
relationship occur in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. and American
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan.7'
In Jackson, a customer claimed her due process rights were violated
when the electric utility terminated her services without notice and a
hearing.72 The Court held that no state action was present even though
the state licensed the utility and the company had a virtual monopoly on
provision of electrical services. The Court emphasized that the utility
which took the action was the subject of the customer's complaint was
privately held and operated, rather than publicly owned. Moreover, the
Court noted, the utility's termination of services practices, while part of a
provision of a general tariff filed with the Public Utility Commission
(PUC), were never subject to Commission scrutiny. Because the state
actor, the PUC, never specifically authorized or approved the utility's
termination practices, even the heavy state regulation combined with the
state's virtual monopoly on utility services did not meet the threshold for
70. An examination of all the Supreme Court cases applying the entanglement test
would be unhelpful since there are no state action cases directly on point and the cases
involve fact intensive analysis. I have selected two prominent state action cases where
the private entity is extensively regulated by the state-a factual situation that is similar
to that presented by the relationship between the SEC and the brokerage members. The
analogy may be helpful to shed light on the kinds of factors the Court considers salient
when conducting state action analysis. Lower courts have addressed more analogous
cases. In Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993), for
example, the D.C. Circuit found state action when Congress implemented regulations that
conferred authority on cable television operators to ban indecent material from cable
access channels but stripped them of editorial control over any other type of
programming. According to the court, these regulations were intended to further a
government policy designed to limit children's access to indecent material. The
regulations furthered the government policy by defining what constituted indecent
material and then requiring operators to identify indecent material on access channels.
The government also expressed a willingness to step in to resolve disputes over the
definition of indecent material. Id. at 819. Rejecting the government's argument that the
cable operator ultimately makes the decision whether to permit access to indecent
programming, the court held that the statutory scheme "significantly encourages" the
cable operators to comply with the government policy and thus is state action. Id. at 818.
71. Jackson v. Metro Edison Co., 419 U.S. 347 (1974); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
72. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 347.
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state action. Although the Court suggested that the outcome might have
been different had the government been more actively involved in
approving the challenged process, the lack of overt state encouragement
of the termination practice "does not transmute a practice initiated by the
utility . . . into state action. 73
In American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan,74 the
Court examined Pennsylvania's workers' compensation scheme. Under
this scheme, an employer found liable for an employee's work-related
injury is responsible for all "reasonable and necessary" medical
expenses.75  In 1993, Pennsylvania created a utilization review
organization (URO) to review contested workers' compensation claims.
Under the 1993 legislation, insurers were authorized to withhold
payment of workers' compensation benefits to employees after the
insurer filed a claim with the URO asserting that the payments were not
reasonable and necessary.76 The claimants in Sullivan, ten employees
and two employee organizations who received benefits under the act,
sued defendants, two Pennsylvania program administrators and private
insurance companies that offered workers' compensation coverage.77
The claimants contended that the state's creation of a system designed to
permit withholding of payments was state action, which denied them due
process without proper notice or hearing. 8
The Court stated that claimants must show both that a constitutional
deprivation of a state-created right or privilege had occurred and that the
"party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be
said to be a state actor., 79 Acknowledging that the 1993 amendments
may encourage insurers to withhold payments for disputed medical
73. Id. at 357. The Court rejected the customer's attempt to analogize her case to
the situation in Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
451 (1952). In that case, the District of Columbia PUC investigated the transit
company's use of piped music on public buses. Pollak, 343 U.S at 451. After
conducting a full hearing, the Commission concluded that the transit company's practices
were "not inconsistent with public convenience, comfort and safety," and, moreover, that
such practices might improve conditions for those riding the bus. Id. at 463-65. The
Jackson Court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to analogize her situation to Pollak because
"no such imprimatur" was placed on the private utility's termination practices because no
approval process occurred. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357. In the absence of such approval,
the challenged termination practice could not be considered state action. Id. at 357-59.
74. 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
75. Id. at 44.
76. Id. at 45-47.
77. Id. at 47-48.
78. Id. at 48.
79. Id. at 50 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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treatment, the Court concluded that the second requirement was not
satisfied by a demonstration that the state encouraged the behavior.8
According to the Court:
subtle encouragement is no more significant than that which inheres in the
State's creation or modification of any legal remedy. We have never held
that the mere availability of a remedy for wrongful conduct, even when the
private use of that remedy serves important public interests, so significantly
encourages the private activity as to make the State responsible for it.
8 1
In other words, a scheme that enables or even encourages withholding of
payment will not create state action when the decision whether to
withhold payment is made by the private insurer acting alone.8 2
The Court also considered whether a private party's use of a state-
created dispute resolution system imbued the private action with state
action characteristics. 83 Although the URO's decisions, like any other
state-created adjudicative entity, would be considered state action, the
Court concluded that a private party's mere use of the State's dispute
resolution machinery, without the "overt, significant assistance of state
officials," cannot.84  Thus, even when the state creates both the
mechanism and the procedures through which a deprivation may occur
and, by so doing, encourages parties to use it, the Court will not find
state action.85
Sullivan, like Jackson, involves a heavily regulated industry-
worker's compensation insurance.86 In Sullivan, the state created a
dispute resolution system that private parties might decide to utilize.87
Yet the Court found that there is no state action in the creation of this
system because the insurance companies are neither obligated nor even
overtly encouraged to use the system. 8 Jackson suggests that state
action is not present when a governmentally regulated industry makes
private decisions that affect another's rights. Sullivan adds that even if
80. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 50.
81. Id. at 53; Tulsa Prof 1 Collection Servs, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988)
("Private use of state-sanctioned private remedies or procedures does not rise to the level
of state action."); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165-66 (1978).
82. See Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 53.
83. Id. at 54.
84. Id. (citing Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 486).
85. Id. at 57.
86. Id. at 56.
87. Id. at 45.
88. Id. at 52-54.
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the industry makes use of a state structure to deprive the person of her
rights, state action is still not present. Applying this analysis to the SEC-
SRO relationship suggests that state action may be present in that
context. The SEC heavily regulates the SROs.89 While the SROs create
their own dispute resolution practice (akin to the Jackson termination
practice), the SEC, unlike the government in Jackson, is actively
involved in managing the way in which the dispute resolution services
are delivered. Moreover, the SEC mandates that individuals register with
an SRO. 90 In Jackson, by contrast, the use of utility services is, at most,
implicitly required due to the utility's virtual monopoly on utility
services. In addition, unlike Sullivan, the SEC does strongly encourage
the use of SRO arbitration procedures. 9' Not only does the SRO
approve, modify and reject SRO arbitration rules, but it also mandates
that representatives register with the SROs.92  This mandatory
registration requirement changes the dynamics of the relationship-while
insurers in Sullivan may or may not use the state-created dispute
resolution system-the securities broker-dealers and representatives have
no alternative to using the SRO-created and SEC-approved arbitration
procedures. Thus, it may be that applying Jackson and Sullivan to
securities arbitration would result in a finding of state action.
b. Lower Court Cases
While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question of
whether state action is present in securities arbitration, several lower
courts have considered whether securities arbitration involves state
action.93 While the claimants in these cases were unsuccessful,
89. See, e.g., Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims, Exchange Act Release No. 40,109, 67
SEC Docket 824 (June 22, 1998); OEHMKE, supra note 23; Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
90. See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims, Exchange Act Release No. 40,109, 67
S.E.C. Docket 824.
91. Id.
92. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232.
93. See, e.g., Perpetual Secs., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 137-39 (2d Cir. 2002);
Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Markets, Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1999);
Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1999);
Lodal v. Home Ins. Co. of Ill., No. 95-2187, 1998 WL 393766, at *6 (6th Cir. 1998);
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998); Century
Aluminum of W. Va. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 82 F. Supp. 2d 580, 583 n.4 (S.D.
W. Va. 2000); Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460
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examination of two of these cases reveals that their analysis is actually
supportive of a state action finding because they were decided prior to
the SEC's institution of a registration requirement for brokers.9 4 The
cases intimate that results would have been different had the claimants
been hired after 1993 when the registration requirement went into
effect. 95 This section will examine decisions in which state action has
been found in relationships similar to that between the SEC and the
SROs. These decisions indicate that there is strong precedent for finding
that SROs are state actors as long as the SEC requires brokers and others
to register with an SRO as a condition of their employment.
So intertwined are the SEC and the SROs, that even before the
institution of the 1993 registration requirement, at least two plaintiffs
alleged that the close relationship between the SEC and the SROs means
that SROs are state actors96 when they compel employees to participate
in arbitration. 97 To establish that the SRO is a state actor, member
employees relied principally on the excessive entanglement argument.
98
The member employee claimed an SRO becomes excessively entangled
(N.D. Il. 1997).
94. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1182; Cremin, 957 F. Supp. at 1460.
95. Id.
96. When analyzing whether an entity is a state actor, a court considers whether the
action that the plaintiff challenges is state action. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351 (1974) ("[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."). In other words, a court does
not determine whether an entity is a state actor for purposes of every decision it makes.
Instead, the court considers only whether the entity was a state actor when it made the
decision that adversely affected the plaintiff. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988) ("[I]n the typical case raising a state-action issue, a
private party has taken the decisive step that caused the harm to the plaintiff, and the
question is whether the State was sufficiently involved to treat that decisive conduct as
state action.").
97. Perpetual Sees., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2002); Desiderio v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens
& Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by EEOC v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2003). Every court has
rejected the contention that securities arbitration is state action. However, no court has
analyzed the state action question since the SEC enacted its 1993 amendments that
require brokers to register with an SRO.
98. The Ninth Circuit in Duffield appeared to consider the public function argument
as well. Comparing the SEC's role in regulating the SROs to the role of the Public
Utilities Commission in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the
court concluded that the SEC "has been no more aggressive than the Public Utilities
Commission in Jackson." Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1202. Thus, as in Jackson, no state
action should be found.
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with the government when the SEC moves from simply approving an
SRO's decision to require members to arbitrate to encouraging or
endorsing that action.99 According to the claimants, the encouragement
came from the SEC's ability to approve, reject, or abrogate existing SRO
rules. ' ° Courts rejected this argument, holding instead that the SEC is
not excessively entangled with the SROs because nothing in the
Securities Acts or in the Commission rules or regulations requires
arbitration as a means to resolve disputes within the SROs and the SEC
does not compel SROs to utilize arbitration as a means to resolve
disputes.01
In attempting to convince the court that the SRO is engaged in state
action, the litigants argued that because the SEC compelled them to
register with an SRO as a condition of their employment, the SEC was
sufficiently entangled with the SRO to create state action.102 Both the
Ninth Circuit in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co. and the Northern
District of Illinois in Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. rejected this argument because, prior to 1993, no federal statute or
regulation required a member to register with the securities exchanges or
arbitrate disputes with the member's employer.10 3 In 1993, however, the
SEC adopted a regulation that required all broker-dealers to register with
at least one SRO. 104 Although the Duffield court characterized the new
rule as federal law, it nevertheless rejected Duffield's argument that
because the SEC compelled her to remain registered after the 1993 rule
change, state action was present.10 5 According to the court, that she was
compelled to remain registered was "immaterial. ' 'l °6 The court went on
to say:
No federal law required Duffield to waive her right to litigate employment-
related disputes by signing the Form U-4 [arbitration agreement] in 1988,
and no state action is present in simply enforcing that agreement. Insofar
as Duffield argues that the 'challenged action' is the requirement that she
99. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1202.
100. Id. at 1201.
101. Id. at 1202.
102. Id. at 1201; Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F.
Supp. 1460 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
103. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1201; Cremin, 957 F. Supp. at 1466.
104. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (adopted May 11, 1993).
105. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1201. The court called the rule a "government-mandated
'condition to any participation in a ... securities career."' Id. (quoting Blount v. SEC, 61
F.3d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
106. Id.
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actually arbitrate her lawsuit, that requirement is found in her private
contract, not in federal law. 
107
The Northern District of Illinois rejected Cremin's claim on virtually
identical grounds.'
08
While it is true that the arbitration requirement is in the SRO's U-4
agreement, one might argue that if the SEC, with knowledge of the
arbitration obligation, requires a broker-dealer to register with an SRO or
compels the broker-dealer to remain registered with the SRO, it is
directing the broker-dealer to arbitrate his or her dispute. While the pre-
1993 SRO rule requiring arbitration did not satisfy the state action
requirement, the post-1993 requirement that broker-dealers register with
one of the SROs may indicate that the arbitration requirement is state
action. 09
While such a conclusion is not automatic, analysis of related cases
suggests it is the right answer. As the Duffield court made clear, the
requirement that broker-dealers register with an SRO is quintessential
government regulation. The next question is whether this government-
mandated condition of registration with an SRO, when that SRO
mandates that the registrant resolve all disputes using arbitration, is
sufficient overt or covert encouragement of arbitration to support a
finding that the SROs are state actors when they require arbitration.
Considering the same issue in the context of municipal securities,
the D.C. Circuit found in Blount v. SEC that a rule regulating the conduct
of brokers that was promulgated by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board (MSRB) and approved by the SEC was state action." 0 The court
107. Id.
108. Cremin, 957 F. Supp. at 1466 (examining law at the time Cremin registered,
1982, not the post-1993 law).
109. The Duffield court suggested this conclusion: In 1993, however, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a regulation that required all broker-dealers to
be registered with at least one of the securities organizations of which Duffield's firm
was a member (i.e. the NASD and the NYSE) before effecting any securities transaction.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (adopted May 11, 1993). That registration regulation, like
the SEC's registration regulation at issue in Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995),
"operates not as a private compact among brokers and dealers but as federal law." Id. at
941. Hence, to borrow Blount's reasoning, as a government-mandated "condition to any
participation in a ... securities career," the current requirement that new employees
register with a national securities exchange "constitutes government action of the purest
sort." Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1201 (While the Duffield court did not conclude that the SRO-
imposed arbitration agreement constituted state action, the holding that the registration
requirement is state action suggests that consequences that flow directly from the
requirement would also constitute state action.).
110. Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Rule G-37, at issue in
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found that the MSRB was a state actor when it enforced its conduct rule
because the Exchange Act requires brokers and dealers to register with
the MSRB before they may trade municipal securities and violations of
MSRB rules may result in sanctions including suspension or loss of the
broker-dealer's trading license."' The court concluded that Rule G-37
was government action because it was a "government-enforced condition
to any participation in a municipal securities career."' 12 Under Blount's
reasoning, a registration requirement together with regulatory
enforcement of a private entity's rules satisfies the requirement for state
action.
The primary difference between the MSRB and other SROs like the
NASD is that the government created the MSRB but not the other SROs.
Yet the Blount court put this distinction aside when it assessed whether
the implementation of Rule G-37 was state action." 13 If this distinction is
irrelevant," 14 it is difficult to see a difference between the SEC's
relationship with the SROs and their arbitration requirement and the
MSRB's decision to promulgate a regulation that effects the purpose of
the Exchange Act. After all, the SEC regulates SROs closely and federal
regulations mandate that broker-dealers from each SRO register with the
SEC." '5 In fact, the considerable interaction and close relationship that
exists between the SEC and the non-municipal SROs suggests an even
stronger argument in favor of state action than in the Blount case.
The SEC's active involvement in regulating arbitration, together
with the reasoning in the leading case, Blount, suggests that SROs are
Blount, restricted municipal securities professionals from engaging in "pay to play". In
other words, the rule prohibited brokers from making contributions to or soliciting
contributions on behalf of state officials from whom they obtain business.
111. Id. at941.
112. Id.
113. Id. The court said, "[w]e put to one side the Board's questionable assertion
that it is a purely private organization even though it was created by an act of Congress
and directed by Congress to 'propose and adopt rules to effect the purposes of the
[Exchange Act]' within specified constraints." Id.
114. The distinction may be irrelevant both because the Blount court did not
consider it in analyzing the state action question and because it makes little difference as
a practical matter. Although Congress mandated the creation of the MSRB, it is an SRO
that is organized as a nonprofit corporation governed by Virginia law. A private entity
does not become public simply because federal legislation creates it. ROBERT A.
FIPPINGER, THE SECURITIES LAW OF PUBLIC FINANCE § 9:7.4, at 9-103 (2001). Fippinger
concluded that "the congressional mandate of the creation of the MSRB, as opposed to its
creation as a voluntary association of brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers,
has little relevance to whether the MSRB if private or public and governmental." Id.
115. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1567-1 (1993).
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state actors when they require broker-dealers to arbitrate disputes
following the SEC's 1993 adoption of a mandatory registration
requirement."16 Like the brokers in Blount, securities arbitration of non-
discrimination employment disputes is a government-enforced condition
to participation in a securities career. Thus, the arbitration requirement
"constitutes government action of the purest sort."' 17
Further support for the conclusion that the SROs are state actors
following the 1993 amendments can be found in R.J O'Brien &
Associates, Inc. v. Pipkin.118 In that case, Pipkin claimed that the
National Futures Association (NFA) denied him his constitutional right
to due process when it required him to arbitrate claims made against
him." 9 The Commodity Exchange Act, like the Securities Exchange Act
since 1993, requires persons who actively participate in the industry to
register under the Act. 20 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) oversees the regulation of commodities trading and is also
empowered to register persons under the Act. 2 The CFTC, as permitted
by statute, delegated the registration function to the NFA, a private
corporation.
22
To support his motion to vacate the arbitration award entered
against him, Pipkin contended that the NFA is a state actor when it
registers persons.123 The Seventh Circuit agreed, holding that the NFA
"certainly is [a state actor] when it requires an applicant to agree to
submit to the arbitration rules in order to register under the Act."
' 124
Thus, a federal agency delegation of the required registration function to
116. Few courts have considered whether SROs are private or public entities when
they enforce their rules. In Crimmins v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., 346 F. Supp.
1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), a federal district court concluded that the American Stock
Exchange acted as an arm of the federal government when it conducted a disciplinary
hearing. While the court found that the SRO was a state actor, it nevertheless concluded
that the hearing provided to the broker-dealer satisfied the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment. By contrast, the Seventh Circuit, in Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738
F.2d 179, 186 (7th Cir. 1984), held that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange was not a
federal actor when it auctioned off a seat. The court emphasized that the private nature of
the suit as "only remotely related to the exchange's enforcement functions" in reaching
its conclusion that the exchange was not acting as an arm of the federal government. Id.
117. Blount, 61 F.3d at 941.
118. 64 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 1995).
119. Id. at 259.
120. Id.; see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 6f(a), 6k(l) (2000).
121. Pipkin, 64 F.3d at 259; see 7 U.S.C. §§ 21(o) (2000).
122. Pipkin, 64 F.3d at 259.
123. Id. at 262.
124. Id.
[Vol. 26:73
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss1/4
FAIRNESS IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION
a private corporation, under Pipkin, transforms the private corporation
into a state actor. That the private corporation creates its own arbitration
procedures and rules does not alter the conclusion. Instead, the court
ruled, those procedures and regulations are imposed on the registrant as a
precondition to registration under the Act. 25 Because the registration
function is required, agreement to the procedures is also required and the
registering entity becomes a state actor.
Applying Pipkin to the present situation, the conclusion that an SRO
like the NASD is a state actor because the SEC now requires registration
with an SRO as a precondition to working in the securities industry
seems fairly obvious. 126 Although each SRO creates its own arbitration
procedures and rules, a registrant must agree to them implicitly when it,
as required by federal law, registers with an SRO.
III. Peremptory Strikes and the Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state actor from excluding a
person from serving on a jury on the basis of her race or sex. 127
Exclusion of the prospective juror occurs through the use of a
peremptory strike during the juror selection process. This prohibition,
which E. Gary Spitko and I have described elsewhere as the Batson
principle, 128 may be extended to the arbitration process if a state actor
mandates participation in the process. Extension of the Batson principle
to the arbitration process would render unconstitutional a party's use of
his peremptory strike right to exclude an arbitrator from a panel due to
her race or sex.
As we suggested in a previous article, the problem of discriminatory
use of peremptory strikes is likely more common than it appears.
129
125. Id.
126. The Cremin court was not persuaded by the plaintiffs analogy to Pipkin.
Cremin, 957 F. Supp. at 1466. According to the court, the analogy was inapt because
Cremin signed the arbitration agreement prior to 1993. Id. While the court left open the
possibility that Cremin's argument would be successful if she had registered after 1993,
when she would have been required to do so, it rejected her claim because, prior to 1993,
the SEC, unlike the CFTC, did not require individuals to register with an SRO. Id. This
decision is wrong for the same reason Duffield is incorrect-even if Cremin registered
prior to 1993, post-1993, she had no choice but to remain registered. Thus, her obligation
to arbitrate post-1993 is the product of state action.
127. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
128. Sarah Rudolph Cole & E. Gary Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle,
38 GA. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2004).
129. Id.
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Because both the NYSE and NASD provide parties with one peremptory
challenge of an arbitrator,' 30 it probably occurs in securities arbitration as
well. The primary way in which this problem would arise in securities
arbitration is as follows: A party might use his peremptory challenge to
create an arbitral panel that disadvantages the other party. For example,
if a securities broker was a young, African-American woman, the
brokerage against which she had a claim might strike any African-
Americans from the panel. In the alternative, the brokerage might strike
all the women from a particular panel. Since there are few women or
African-Americans on securities arbitration panels (the typical securities
arbitrator is still an older white male), efforts to exclude these arbitrators
would likely be successful and, at the same time, occur unnoticed.' 3
In the trial context, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits a state actor from excluding a person from
serving on a jury on the basis of his race or sex. 32 In another article,
Professor E. Gary Spitko and I explored whether it is permissible for a
party to a court-ordered or contractual arbitration to exercise a
peremptory strike against a potential arbitrator on the basis of the
potential arbitrator's race, sex or other characteristic that would not be a
permissible basis for such a strike of a potential juror in a public court
proceeding. 33  We concluded that state action is not present when a
private litigant exercises a peremptory challenge in a contractual
arbitration proceeding but is present when the litigant exercises the
challenge in a court-ordered arbitration.134 With respect to contractual
arbitration, we concluded that a court would determine that the factors
present in cases where state action is found-overt racial discrimination,
130. NYSE, Inc., Rules & Constitution § 609 (2003) (stating that a party has one
peremptory challenge that must be used within ten days of notification of arbitrator
names); NASD, Manual of Procedural Rules § 10311 (2001) (explaining that a party has
one peremptory challenge that must be exercised within ten days after notification). Both
forums allow an additional peremptory challenge in the "interests of justice." See NASD,
Code of Arbitration Procedure § 10311; NYSE, Inc., Rules & Constitutions § 609.
131. Another example of discriminatory selection of an arbitrator occurred in Smith
v. American Arbitration Ass'n, Inc., 233 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2000), when a party
opposing a female litigant struck the sole female arbitrator from the list of fifteen
potential arbitrators provided to the parties by AAA. Ruling against the female litigant,
the court stated that no state action is present when arbitrator selection occurs pursuant to
a private contract between private parties who are under no obligation to arbitrate their
disputes. Id.
132. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129
(1994).
133. Cole & Spitko, supra note 128, at 1147.
134. Id. at 1195-96.
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compulsion of jurors in a public setting or institutional integrity of the
court system-are not present when a litigant exercises a peremptory
challenge in the arbitral setting.135  In the absence of a state action
finding, discriminatory peremptory challenges are not unconstitutional. 1
36
This article, by contrast, focuses on the question of whether state
action is present when the SEC requires representatives to register with
an SRO as a condition of their employment when the SRO subsequently
mandates that they participate in arbitration. Unlike contractual
arbitration, strong arguments support the notion that the SEC's
encouragement of the arbitration process for securities employment
disputes together with the registration requirement creates state action in
securities arbitration. If one is convinced by the arguments presented in
Parts I and II, then a party's decision to strike a prospective arbitrator on
a discriminatory basis would violate the other party's right to equal
protection. Applying the Batson principle to securities arbitration, a
party who suspects that an arbitrator was removed because of her race or
sex should be able to bring a claim in court challenging any subsequently
issued arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator selection
process was discriminatory.137
IV. Securities Arbitration: Employment Claim as Property Right
Reform of securities arbitration will not automatically occur
following a finding that the SEC's mandatory registration requirement is
state action. Once a court finds state action in securities arbitration, the
next inquiry is whether an employee's claim is a property right."' This
135. Id. at 1240.
136. Id. at 1163.
137. In Arbitration and the Batson Principle, Professor Spitko and I proposed a
process for challenging an arbitration award due to discriminatory selection or exclusion
of an arbitrator. Supra note 128. If a disputant has reason to believe that an arbitrator
was selected or excluded for discriminatory reasons, the disputant must notify the
opposing disputant within seven days of discovering that discrimination occurred. The
disputant must then seek a hearing with the arbitrator or arbitral panel within fourteen
days of discovering that discrimination occurred during the selection of the arbitrator or
arbitral panel. During the hearing, the arbitrator or arbitral panel will hear evidence
under oath from all parties involved in the alleged discriminatory selection or exclusion.
If the arbitrator or arbitral panel finds discrimination in the selection or exclusion of an
arbitrator, then the arbitrator or arbitral panel shall order the removal or replacement of
any arbitrator affected by the discriminatory selection. A party may bring a claim in
court under the proposed section for up to thirty days after the final arbitration award is
entered. Id. at 1227-28.
138. The Due Process Clause also protects liberty interests. Under current Supreme
2005]
27
PACE LAWREVIEW
question is essential to reforming securities arbitration because the Due
Process Clause can be invoked only to protect liberty or property
interests. This section of the article will consider whether the SEC's
mandate that employees with employment-related claims proceed in
arbitration deprives the employee of a property interest in the forum
established by state or federal law. If the right to proceed in a particular
forum is a property right, then the next consideration is how much
process is due before the state can deprive the individual of that interest.
The Due Process Clause states that, "[n]o person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 139 A
court will apply the Due Process Clause to state action only if it finds
Court jurisprudence, however, it is extremely unlikely that the reduced process available
to an employee in securities arbitration amounts to deprivation of a liberty interest. The
employee would contend that she has been deprived of the right to have a particular state
or federal agency and, subsequently, a federal court, adjudicate her claim and determine
whether she is entitled to damages such as back pay, attorney's fees and other
compensatory damages. Moreover, she could argue that she has been deprived of the
right not to be deprived of a property interest by her employer. In addition, she could
argue that she has been deprived of the ability to have an agency determine whether to
clear her record for purposes of obtaining future employment and/or vindicate her in front
of her co-workers and peers, thus restoring her dignity and self-esteem by determining
whether the employer terminated her for unlawful reasons. Further, she could assert that
she was arguably denied her right to have her claim heard by a federal court, following
assessment by a state or federal agency. This denial has the effect of preventing her from
correcting the impression among co-workers, peers and future employers that she was
terminated for non-discriminatory reasons. Finally, diversion to arbitration, the claimant
might argue, prevents her from receiving the investigation and hearing the state or federal
agency would provide. Denial of this valuable benefit works a hardship on the claimant
by preventing her from obtaining an agency finding of reasonable cause. Such a finding,
though rare, is a tremendous bargaining chip in subsequent settlement negotiations with
the employer. Yet claimant's argument that she is entitled to the protection of the Due
Process Clause under a liberty interest theory may be flawed. While she has a property
right in her employment claim, it is less clear that she has suffered government
defamation in a typical termination case. While termination of one's employment is
likely to hinder one's future employability, it is difficult to argue that an employee-at-
will's loss of a single job amounts to the kind of defamation at issue in Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635 (1980) (harm to individual's reputation, together with
termination, amounts to deprivation of liberty interest), or Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976) (publication of name on list of shoplifters not a denial of liberty interest). In those
cases, the defamation had a much more public character. In addition, in Owen, the
defamation occurred at the same time as the deprivation of the property right. 445 U.S. at
624-30. Moreover, it is hard to argue that termination of an employee-at-will amounts to
defamation since the employer rarely provides reasons supporting the termination. In
addition, acceptance of the argument that an employee has a liberty interest in the
combination of alleged defamation and deprivation of a property right is the kind of
slippery slope courts hope to avoid.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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that the state's action has jeopardized a property interest. 140 If a court
concludes that the state has deprived an individual of a property interest,
the right to some kind of hearing becomes paramount. 141 The
Constitution does not create property interests; instead, such interests are
created and defined by "existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlements to those
benefits."'142 Once a state creates a property right, it may not deprive an
individual of that right "except pursuant to constitutionally adequate
procedures."1
43
To successfully challenge securities arbitration procedures for
procedural due process violations, a securities employee must establish
that she has a property right in her employment claim. If the employee
has a property right, then she would need to demonstrate that the state's
diversion of her claim to arbitration results in a deprivation of that right
without adequate procedural safeguards. The Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether a cause of action is a property right in Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co.144 In Logan, the plaintiff filed a charge with the
Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission, claiming that
Zimmerman Brush had unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis
of his handicap when it terminated his employment. 45 Pursuant to the
Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, the Commission was required to
hold a hearing within 120 days after a claimant filed a charge. 146 The
Commission failed to hold the hearing within the designated time
period. 147 Concluding that the time period was mandatory, the state court
dismissed Logan's claim. 148  Logan appealed, contending that the
Commission's failure to hold a hearing within the allotted time violated
his right to due process because the FEP Act created a property interest
140. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 229 (3d ed. 1999). The article focuses on property
rights because the argument that an employee's legal claim is a liberty interest is fairly
weak.
141. Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
142. Id. at 577.
143. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
144. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
145. Id. at 426.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 426-27.
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in a discrimination cause of action. 149  The Supreme Court agreed,
holding that a state created cause of action is "a species of property
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."'150
Moreover, the right was constitutionally protected because Illinois had
guaranteed to Logan a right to redress "under what is, in essence, a 'for
cause' standard., 15' Subsequent cases confirm the theory that an
individual has a property right in a cause of action under a state-created
statutory scheme.
152
Although the Court did not specify the procedures the Commission
should use, it outlined the requirements of due process.'5 3 According to
the Court, the Commission should "consider the merits of [the] claim,
based upon the substantiality of the available evidence, before deciding
whether to terminate his claim .... 1s4 Thus, under Logan, a court may
not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of a state-conferred
property interest without following applicable procedural safeguards.
Moreover, the federal Constitution is the standard against which the
adequacy of the state-offered procedural safeguards must be measured.155
The next question is whether the alternative scheme provided by the
state (or state actor) satisfies constitutional due process requirements. 156
Once a claimant establishes that he has a property right, he looks to
federal law to determine what procedures he is entitled to under the Due
Process Clause before the government may deprive him of that right.
While the securities firms, as state actors, may have articulated
procedures to govern their disposition of an employee's property right,
whether those procedures satisfy the Due Process Clause is a question of
149. Id. at 430.
150. Id. at 428 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950)).
151. Id. at 431. The Court also noted that the "hallmark of property" is "an
individual entitlement grounded in state law which cannot be removed except 'for
cause."' Id. at 430. In other words, once the state grants an entitlement to an individual,
such as the ability to pursue an employment discrimination claim through a state agency
process, the state may not take away that right without demonstrating good reason. The
existence of the state scheme is what creates the necessary "for cause" requirement.
152. Cooper v. Bombala, 34 F. Supp. 2d 693, 698 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Jabbari v. Ill.
Human Rts. Comm'n, 527 N.E.2d 480, 483 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Salazar v. Ohio Civil Rts
Comm'n, 528 N.E.2d 1303, 1307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (right to file handicap
discrimination charge is property right); Bennett v. Tucker, 827 F.2d 63, 70 (7th Cir.
1987) (claimant's right to have department determine claim is a property right).
153. Logan, 455 U.S. at 433-34.
154. Id. at 434.
155. Id. at 432.
156. See Salazar, 528 N.E.2d at 1307.
[Vol. 26:73
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss1/4
FAIRNESS IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION
federal law. To determine what process is due in securities arbitration, a
court would look to the test the Supreme Court articulated in Mathews v.
Eldridge,'57 a seminal case on the question of how much due process is
constitutionally sufficient. In Mathews, the Court set forth a three-part
balancing test to be used in deciding what process is due before the state
deprives an individual of a property interest. 158 The Court's flexible and
context-specific test identifies three factors to be considered:
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.159
In evaluating the second factor, regarding the reliability of the challenged
procedures and the possible value of extra process, the Court created a
balancing test where due process is determined through a weighing of the
costs and benefits of whatever procedures the claimant contends the due
process clause requires. 160 Following Mathews, the Court has repeatedly
demonstrated that the balancing test is the critical factor in determining
whether additional process is due.' 61
For example, in Logan, the Court applied this test to determine how
much process an employee is entitled to before the government could
deprive him of his employment discrimination claim. 162 In Logan, the
Court said that the private interests at stake included the right to be free
from employment discrimination and to a procedure that allowed
vindication of that right.163 The risk of erroneous deprivation of the right
was high, at least in Logan's case, where the state agency reached no
determination regarding the merits of Logan's claim and provided no
procedural safeguards to prevent or reduce the impact of the error when
the termination was due to the agency's negligence. 164 Weighed against
these two factors, the Court considered the state's administrative
157. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
158. Id. at 334-35.
159. Id. at 335.
160. Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1351 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted).
161. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434 (1982).
162. Id. at 433-35.
163. Id. at 434.
164. Id. at 434-35.
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interests. While administrative costs undoubtedly weigh against too
many procedural safeguards, the Court concluded that the additional cost
of avoiding terminating someone's claim in its entirety could hardly be
said to outweigh the other relevant considerations. 65 That few claimants
will be in Logan's position further supported the Court's conclusion.
Thus, in Logan, application of the Mathews test led to the conclusion that
the existing procedures did not satisfy due process. 166 While the Court
did not articulate the procedure the FEPC should follow, it emphasized
that the State must "consider the merits of his charge, based upon the
substantiality of the availability of evidence, before deciding whether to
terminate his claim."'167 In other words, before Logan's claim can be
terminated, he is entitled to some kind of hearing to adjudicate his state-
created tort claim.
Because Mathews demands an individualized cost-benefit analysis
in each case where a claimant demands additional due process, it is
difficult to predict when and under what circumstances a court will find
that the Due Process Clause is or is not satisfied. Applying Mathews to
securities arbitration, however, yields clearer results than is typical in a
procedural due process case, at least with respect to the use of written,
reasoned opinions. Because the costs of opinions are now documented
68
and the various interests relatively easy to quantify, the Mathews test
applied to securities arbitration reveals that the Due Process Clause
requires the use of well-reasoned written opinions in securities
arbitration.
V. Well-Reasoned Written Opinion Requirement
According to NASD rules, arbitration awards must be in writing and
include "a summary of the issues.., the damages (awarded)... and a
statement of any other issues resolved."'169 The rules do not require the
arbitrators to write opinions with reasons supporting their conclusions. 1
70
Not surprisingly, few NASD arbitration awards contain anything other
than a statement of the issues and an indication of whether or not relief
165. Id. at 437 n.10.
166. Id. at 434-35.
167. Id. at 434.
168. See infra pp. 106-08.
169. NASD, Code of Arbitration Procedure § 10330(e).
170. Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Marc J. Greenspon, Securities Arbitration:
Bankrupt, Bothered and Bewildered, 7 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 131, 146 (2002).
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was granted.' 7' Applying Mathews against this backdrop demonstrates
that well-reasoned opinions are required in securities arbitration.
Under Mathews, a court must consider both the private interest in
additional procedures and the government interest the challenged policy
advances. The private interests at stake in securities arbitration, as in
Logan, are the right to be free from illegal on-the-job mistreatment and
to a procedure that allows an employee to vindicate that right. Next, a
court would consider whether the existing procedures used to evaluate
the interest are likely to result in an erroneous deprivation of that interest.
Unquestionably, plaintiffs believe well-reasoned opinions are necessary
to ensure proper handling of their claims. While some contend that
creating a well-reasoned opinion requirement would undermine the
efficiency of the arbitration process, 172 the voices clamoring for
explanations of adverse decisions continue to demand this change to the
arbitration process. 173 However, an individual is not entitled to process
simply because he wants it. Instead, he must demonstrate that without
the additional procedural safeguards, an erroneous deprivation of his
property right may occur. Without reasoned written opinions, the risk of
discriminatory and illegitimate awards is considerable. In the absence of
a means for holding arbitrators accountable for their decisions, there is a
risk that arbitrators will make decisions for arbitrary and capricious
171. See, e.g., Podber v. Interstate Johnson Lane/Wachovia, Inc., 2003 WL 271323
(NASD Jan. 23, 2003); Bell v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 2002 WL 535953 (NASD
Mar. 1, 2002); Walborn v. Aetna Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 2001 WL 1004226 (NASD
Aug. 1, 2001). Professor Jennifer J. Johnson reviewed NASD opinions from 2003-04
resolving customer-broker disputes. She found that in 2003, only 5% of the 2077
customer cases closed through arbitration offered even a brief explanation of the panel's
decision. In 2004, her review of arbitration awards revealed that fewer than 5% of the
2,423 NASD customer cases closed through the arbitration process included an opinion
that explained the award. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West:
Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. __ (2006).
172. Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do Brokerage
Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415, 450-51 (2003).
173. See Cane & Greenspon, supra note 170, at 151-52 ("[S]ecurities arbitrators
should be compelled to provide written rationale for their award. While this may lessen
arbitral finality, it may preserve the fundamental principles of fairness upon which any
dispute resolution system operates."). DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION
PROCEDURE MANUAL 13-14 (5th ed. 2001). A GAO report concluded that most industry
representatives and investors (this was a survey of consumers and brokers) support
federal legislation requiring arbitrators to write a short opinion when issuing an
arbitration award. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: How
INVESTORS FAIR 53-54 (1992), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d32tl0/146692.pdf.
Jean Sternlight states that due process requires that the parties "know at least something
of the arbitrator's rationale." Sternlight, supra note 8, at 95.
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reasons or for reasons that are inconsistent with well-established law.
Thus, the well-reasoned opinion requirement may be necessary to avoid
erroneous deprivation of the plaintiffs property right.
One proponent of written arbitration awards, Stephen Hayford,
contends that the absence of reasoned awards in the commercial
arbitration context is particularly troubling because without it, parties
have no "reliable indicia of whether the arbitrator's decision was founded
on a full understanding of the material facts and a proper interpretation
and application ... of the relevant law.' ' 174 Moreover, Hayford argues,
the failure to provide parties with any insight regarding the arbitrator's
decision making process encourages losing parties to be dissatisfied with
the arbitration process, and, more problematically, to attempt to vacate
the arbitration award. 175  Professor Black contends, by contrast, that
written opinions will not be beneficial and that the vacatur challenges
occur for other reasons. 176 If Hayford's claims are true, however, the
absence of reasoned written opinions may be reducing the efficiency of
securities arbitration, a result that the government would neither desire
nor intend. Thus, the private interest in reasoned written opinions is
strong and the government's interest (the third Mathews factor) may
actually be served by the addition of a reasoned written opinion as a
procedural safeguard.
The government's interest, including the potential of increased
fiscal and administrative burdens, is minimal here for three reasons.
First, the addition of the well-reasoned written opinion requirement
might improve the efficiency of the arbitration process because requests
for vacatur might be reduced. Second, the increased costs are minimal.
According to the NASD, the increased cost of requiring arbitrators to
provide reasons for their decisions adds only $300 to the cost of the
arbitration in a consumer case. 177 One would expect that the costs would
change minimally in a case involving an employee. Finally, the state
would experience no increased administrative burden. The arbitrators
who heard the case would simply spend two or three additional hours
discussing the case, deliberating and then writing down the reasons for
their decision. Other than a slight increase in the costs associated with
174. Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking
the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 443, 446 (1998).
175. Id.
176. See Black, supra note 172, at 451.
177. See infra p. 110.
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paying the arbitrator, 178 no additional administrative burden is detectable.
Thus, the government interest in preventing this additional procedural
safeguard is minimal.
Of course, the inquiry does not end with an examination of the
individual's and state's interests. Mathews also requires a court to
consider whether additional procedural protections increase the
likelihood that the government's decision is correct. 179 Applying this
factor, lower courts find that an individual is entitled to additional due
process only if the benefits of the additional procedure outweigh the
costs of that procedure.18 ° To understand the benefits of a written
opinion, the article turns to the field of cognitive psychology.
Cognitive psychologists analyze the methods individuals use to
make decisions and offer suggestions about how to improve decision
quality. 181  Cognitive psychologists believe that individuals utilize
heuristics to assist them when evaluating available choices. These
heuristics are short cuts that individuals use to make the decision making
178. The NASD's proposal permits customers or associated persons to request an
"explained decision." NASD, NASD Proposed Rule Change, SR-NASD-2005-032,
available at http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS GETPAGE&ssDocName
=NASDW_013542 (last visited Jan. 6, 2005). An explained decision is a "fact-based
award stating the reason(s) each alleged cause of action was granted or denied. Inclusion
of legal authorities and damage calculations is not required." NASD, Rule § 10330(j)(2)
(Proposed Change 2005). In developing this proposed rule, the NASD may have
incorrectly assessed the costs of their explained decision requirements. Moreover, it may
be that the Due Process Clause demands greater explanation of decisions than does the
proposed NASD rule. In addition, the demands placed on the arbitrators by the proposed
rule change may require a change in the way arbitrators are trained and paid. Though
often experienced in dispute resolution or securities (and sometimes both), NASD
arbitrators are essentially volunteers who receive little training and insignificant
remuneration. If the NASD's rule change is approved, or if the Due Process Clause
demands greater explanation in awards, both arbitrators' compensation and training
would likely need to be enhanced. Obviously, these increases would affect the financial
burden of reasoned opinions for the government. See Barbara Black, Do We Expect Too
Much from NASD Arbitrators? It's Time for Serious Consideration of Professional
Arbitrators, 2004 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1 (2004).
179. PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 140, at 274-75.
180. Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1351 (7th Cir. 1997) "the use
of cost-benefit analysis to determine due process is not to every constitutional scholar's
or judge's taste, but it is the analysis ... followed by the lower courts .. " Id. (citing
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993)); Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990); McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir.
1982); Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1982); Chem. Waste Mgmt.,
Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Artway v. Attorney General of New
Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1251 (3d Cir. 1996)).
181. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review
ofAgency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 486, 491-92 (2002).
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process less cognitively demanding. 182 An individual's use of various
heuristics to make certain kinds of decisions will, most of the time, result
in sufficiently accurate decisions. Yet, cognitive psychologists have
discovered that individuals use these short cuts even when their use
results in inaccurate decision making. For example, the availability
heuristic describes the situation where an individual correlates his ability
to recall a type of event with the likelihood that the event will occur. In
other words, if one can recall an event easily, one is likely to believe that
the event will reoccur more often than is statistically supportable. Thus,
the availability heuristic leads a decision maker to over-predict the
likelihood of events that are easy for him to recall. 
183
Together with availability, numerous other heuristics help
individuals make quick and relatively accurate decisions every day about
where to eat dinner and what route to take to work. Yet, the use of these
heuristics to make more complex decisions may lead to poor results.
Fortunately, recent research in the field has identified yet additional
heuristics that individuals use to reduce the decisional error resulting
from interaction among the various biases. These might be called
"modifying heuristics." That is, they are heuristics that operate on top of
other heuristics to correct the bias that results from use of those initial
heuristics. Research on one of these modifying heuristics, known as
accountability, suggests that the more likely an individual is to be held
accountable for his decisions, the more likely he will make efforts to
improve the quality of his decision making. 114 In other words, the greater
a decision maker's responsibility for a judgment, the more careful and
complete will be his use of the relevant evidence.' 85 Accountability also
reduces the extent to which decision makers are subject to some of the
182. Id. at 494-95.
183. Mark Seidenfeld offers an example of the impact of the availability heuristic in
the context of EPA rulemaking. According to Seidenfeld, legal scholars believe that
"virtually every rule promulgated by the EPA is challenged in court." The statistics
reveal that only 3 to 26% of EPA rules are challenged. This difference between "folklore
and reality," states Seidenfeld, "may well reflect that rules subject to challenge are much
more salient in the minds of members of the agency and hence easier for them to recall,
leading agency members to believe that eighty percent or more of all rules were
challenged." Id. at 501-02.
184. David. M. Sanbonmatsu, Sharon A. Akimoto & Earlene Biggs, Overestimating
Causality: Attributional Effects of Confirmatory Processing, 65 J. PERS. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 892, 896 (1993); see also Philip E. Tetlock, Linda Skitka & Richard Boettger,
Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity,
and Bolstering, 57 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 632 (1989).
185. Sanbonmatsu, supra note 184, at 896.
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various other types of psychological biases described above. 8 6  In
addition, accountability causes a decision maker to be more careful with
his decision if he may suffer negative consequences because he failed to
justify the decision by providing a satisfactory explanation for it.'87
Although accountability may have other effects on a decision maker,
cognitive psychologists agree that one effect of accountability is to
increase the likelihood that a decision maker will consider all relevant
evidence and "modify initial impressions in response to contradictory
evidence."
188
In the securities arbitration context, the accountability heuristic
suggests that an arbitrator who is obligated to provide parties with a
reasoned written opinion will be more careful in evaluating the evidence
and less likely to be influenced by inherent decision making biases. This
will result in three effects. First, the arbitrator will be aware that the
parties will be likely to view him negatively (i.e. hold him accountable)
if the reasons the arbitrator provides for his decision are unsatisfactory.
Thus, accountability will lead arbitrators to be more careful when
providing justifications for their decisions. Second, a written opinion
makes judicial review more likely, and also makes it more likely that
judicial review will be meaningful. Thus, the possibility of judicial
review is a further accountability check that will limit an arbitrator's
tendency to rely inappropriately on biases rather than analysis. 18
9
While cognitive psychology cannot quantify the benefit of making a
decision maker accountable, it does suggest that more accurate decisions
and meaningful judicial review are a likely outcome of increasing
186. These other biases often lead a decision maker to inferior decisions. The bias
heuristics include attribution (the tendency to attribute one's beliefs and opinions to
others), overconfidence (experts tend to be overconfident about decisions they make
based on relevant evidence) and availability (the ability to recall similar events to assist in
the current decision). Decision makers can be affected by other biases as well. Mark
Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51
DUKE L. J. 1059, 1063-64 (2001).
187. Id. at 1064.
188. Tetlock, supra note 184, at 632.
189. Professor Mark Seidenfeld examined the accountability heuristic in the context
of arbitrary and capricious judicial review of administrative agency rule-making.
According to Seidenfeld, judicial review creates agency accountability. This
accountability reduces the decision maker's reliance on shortcuts which often represent
use of inappropriate biases. Arbitrary and capricious review reduces the impact of
individual biases in agency decision making and creates the proper incentives for agency
staff "to take appropriate care and to avoid many systematic biases when formulating
rules and ushering them through the rulemaking process." Seidenfeld, supra note 186, at
547-48.
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decision maker accountability. The next question, then, is to what extent
the benefits of accountability are outweighed, if at all, by the increased
cost of written opinions. Fortunately, unlike most cases analyzed under
the Mathews rubric, good empirical evidence exists regarding the costs
of adding the reasoned written opinion procedure. Recently, the NASD
proposed an amendment to its rules that would require arbitrators to
provide written awards at the request of consumers' counsel.1 90
According to the NASD, the additional cost of a written explanation is
$600.191 NASD offered in its amendment to pay for half of the costs.
192
NASD predicts that the request will be made in 300 to 500 of the
approximately 1500 consumer arbitrations NASD administers each
year.193 While this amendment, if adopted, will assist consumers, it does
not appear to change the nature of awards in the employment context,
which this article addresses. Nevertheless, the quantification of opinion
costs provides employees with a strong argument that the additional costs
of the written opinion are relatively small (the filing fee for employment
arbitrations with the NASD is $600 and "forum fees" charged to the
claimant much higher) compared to the accrued benefits of the new
practice-greater accountability of arbitrators, claimant's increased
belief in the fairness of the arbitral process, ability of claimants to change
their future behavior to avoid additional legal difficulty, and ability of
either party to present an effective appeal. Given the added benefits of
the reasoned opinion requirement in terms of decision maker
accountability, a court applying the Due Process Clause should find that
a written opinion that offers a reasoned explanation of the outcome is
required.
Conclusion
The close relationship between the SEC and the SROs creates state
action when the SROs mandate that their employees participate in
arbitration as a condition of their employment. Long before the SEC
created the requirement that all brokerage employees register with the
SEC, the SEC participated actively in developing rules and procedures
governing the SRO arbitration process. Moreover, the SEC encouraged
190. NASD Proposed Rule Change, supra note 178.
191. Justin Kelly, NASD Proposes Plan to Require Written Awards on Request,
ADR WORLD, Feb. 9, 2005, available at http://www.adrworld.com/sp.asp?id=27383.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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and continues to encourage SROs to utilize arbitration as the primary
means for resolving employment disputes. In effect, the SEC is
implicitly mandating participation in arbitration through the combination
of its registration requirement and its approval and encouragement of the
use of arbitration.
The presence of state action in securities arbitration mandates
reform of the securities arbitration process. While other changes may be
necessary, at the very least, two major alterations are necessary. First,
when parties enter peremptory challenges of arbitrators for
discriminatory reasons, the party affected by the illicit challenge has a
right to challenge the arbitration award. Second, and perhaps more
significant, a party's employment claim is entitled to the appropriate
amount of procedural due process before the state (here, the SRO) may
deprive the individual of the claim. While the securities arbitration
process largely comports with due process, one glaring omission is the
lack of well-reasoned written opinions. Applying the cost-benefit
analysis the Court established in Mathews v. Eldridge, a court would
weigh the cost of adding reasons to the written opinions against the
benefits achieved by the new requirement. 194 Requiring well-reasoned
opinions would dramatically increase arbitrators' accountability.
Increased accountability should result in a "better" opinion-better
reasoned and more carefully considered. Given the limited increase in
cost of requiring a well-reasoned written opinion, the benefits that would
accrue in terms of accountability and public perception of the fairness of
the securities arbitration process clearly demonstrate the importance of
requiring a well-reasoned opinion. Because the Due Process Clause
applies to securities arbitration, the well-reasoned opinion requirement
should be quickly implemented. While this may appear to be a small
improvement in the process, in fact, it is likely to reap huge dividends for
all involved in the project of securities arbitration reform.
Importantly, requiring a well-reasoned written opinion in industry
arbitrations may have a broader salutary effect. As a political matter, it
would be extremely difficult for the SROs to provide greater due process
to employees in arbitration with their SROs than to customers. Thus,
even if the Due Process Clause does not demand a well-reasoned written
opinion in the customer-broker relationship (because arbitration between
customers and brokers in not mandatory), a change in industry
arbitrations would likely be extended to customer arbitrations as well.
194. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 348 (1976).
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